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Here you can find publication outputs from the project team, including journal articles and book chapters, as well as works in progress. 

Fratantonio, G. "Can Epistemic Paternalistic Practices Make us Better Epistemic Agents?"

Abstract: According to many epistemologists, knowledge requires justification and justification requires one to appropriately believe on the basis of one’s supporting evidence (cf Conee and Feldman 2004). However, complying with this evidentialist norm is not always so easy. This paper investigates the prospects of using epistemic paternalistic techniques [EP] to help students mitigate or eradicate what I call “evidential vices” or “vices or rationality”: a subset of epistemic vices referring to the various ways in which agents fail to be ideal evidentialist agents. After considering and rejecting traditional veritist-based EP, I consider EP practices motivated by Gnosticism, but I ultimately find these unsatisfying as well. Finally, I consider weak epistemic paternalistic strategies, e.g., epistemic nudging, and provide some reasons for optimism.

Draft avaiable soon

Carter, J.A. "On Some Intracranialist Dogmas in Epistemology". Forthcoming in Asian Journal of Philosophy.

Research questions in mainstream epistemology often take for granted a cognitive internalist picture of the mind. Perhaps this is unsurprising, given the seemingly safe presumptions that (i) knowledge entails belief (viz., the entailment thesis); and that (ii) the kind of belief that knowledge entails supervenes exclusively on brainbound cognition. It will be argued here that (contra orthodoxy) the most plausible version of the entailment thesis holds just that knowledge entails dispositional belief. However, regardless of whether occurrent belief supervenes only as the cognitive internalist permits, we should reject the idea that dispositional belief supervenes only in cognitive internalist-friendly ways. These observations, taken together, reveal two things: first, that a cognitive internalist picture of the mind is much more dispensable in epistemology than has been assumed; and second, that pursuing questions in extended epistemology needn’t involve any radical departure from the commitments of more traditional epistemological projects. 

Thorpe, J. "Scepticism and Self-Scepticism". Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.

A general trend in recent philosophical and empirical work aims to undermine vari- ous traditional claims regarding the distinctive nature of self-knowledge. So far, however, this work has not seriously threatened the Cartesian claim that (at least some) self-knowledge is immune to the sort of sceptical problem that seems to af- flict our knowledge of the external world. In this paper I carry this trend further by arguing that the Cartesian claim is false. This is done by showing that a familiar sceptical argument that targets my knowledge of the external world can be adapted to target my belief that I exist, along with any of my self-knowledge that I know entails my own existence. Thus, my self-knowledge and my knowledge of the ex- ternal world are subject to the same sort of sceptical problem.

Kallestrup, J. "Knowledge-Qua in Groups", forthcoming in Ergo

Abstract. Deflationism about group knowledge is the view that a group has knowledge if and only if most of its members have that knowledge. The case against deflationism has revolved around epistemic divergence arguments, which typically aim to show that members’ knowledge isn’t necessary for group knowledge. This paper is instead devoted to objections against members’ knowledge being sufficient for group knowledge. Focusing on structured groups in which members occupy roles that are connected by internal links in a social network, we develop a notion of knowledge qua such occupancy. We proceed to argue that if deflationists adopt such knowledge-qua as what constitutes structured group knowledge, they have the resources to counter worries about the sufficiency condition. If instead groups are taken to be feature collectives, then similar worries are much less pressing. Finally, we elaborate on the societal function of knowledge-qua, as well as the different epistemic assessments that arise, depending on whether the role or its occupant is considered.

Kallestrup, J. "The Myth of True Lies", forthcoming in Theoria

Abstract. Suppose you assert a proposition p that you falsely believe to be false with the intention to deceive your audience. The standard view has it that you lied. This paper argues against orthodoxy: deceptive lying requires that p be in actual fact false, in addition to your intention to deceive by means of untruthfully asserting that p. We proceed as follows. First, an argument is developed for such falsity condition as the non-psychological component of lying. The problem with the standard view, we profess, is exactly that lying is a purely psychological relation between disbe- lief, assertion, and intention. Then, by scrutinising familiar cases, we revisit the alleged intuitive support for the exis- tence of true lies. It turns out these intuitions can be explained away once we reflect on the characteristic decep- tive hallmarks that are associated with the distinction between lying and botched attempts at lying. Finally, we examine the morality of lying in the light of said falsity condition. The resultant view emphasises our moral sensitivity to the practical consequences of acts of lying, while still accommodating those moral considerations that per- tain exclusively to the psychological components of lying.

Carter, J.A. Digital Knowledge: A Philosophical Investigation. London: Routledge (2024).

Digital Knowledge: A Philosophical Investigation is the first book to squarely and rigorously investigate digital knowledge: what it is, how to make sense of it in connection with received theories of knowledge, and where it is going. Key questions J. Adam Carter examines along the way are the following:


How is mere digital information converted into reliable digital knowledge?

To what extent can digital knowledge be vindicated against sceptical challenges, and in what ways might digital knowledge stand distinctively subject to defeat?

What is the epistemically optimal way for us to decide which tasks to outsource entirely to intelligent machines, and to what extent is further outsourcing appropriate (or not) to verify the results of that same outsourced cognition?

Are there any ways in which the expansion of the datasphere threatens to make knowledge less, rather than more, easy to come by? If so, are there any promising ways to safeguard, epistemically, against such threats?

Using fascinating examples throughout, such as the recent chess match between Stockfish and Google’s AlphaZero, smartphones and personalisation, Digital Knowledge: A Philosophical Investigation is ideal for researchers investigating this fascinating area of research at the intersection of traditional mainstream epistemology, the philosophy of cognitive science, the philosophy of technology, and computer science.

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